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NOTES 
Divided We Fall: Associational Standing and Collective 
Interest 
To invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts, an individual 
plaintiff must have suffered a legally cognizable injury. 1 In the case of 
a plaintiff that is an association, rather than a single individual, cur-
rent doctrine defines a legally cognizable injury in two ways. Standing 
will be accorded to an association if (1) some or all of the association's 
members have suffered individual injury, or (2) the association, lik-
ened to a single person, has suffered an injury comparable to one to 
which an individual could be vulnerable.2 Each of these approaches 
reduces the interest the association seeks to protect to an interest that 
can be construed individualistically, or atomistically.3 Such a concep-
tion interprets both interests and persons in a particular way. First, 
legally cognizable interests are located within and defined with refer-
ence to individual persons. Second, these persons - whether they be 
actual single human agents or other entities fictionalized as such -
are regarded as irrevocably distinct from one another, the bearers of 
private, competing concems.4 
1. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 107, 111, 124-29, 145-47 (2d ed. 1988). 
2. For a full discussion of current associational standing doctrine, see infra Part I. 
3. The terms "atomistic" and "atomistically" refer to a conception of persons and their inter-
ests that portrays persons as isolated "atoms." On this view, persons are like isolated particles, 
perhaps able to co-exist successfully if external conditions permit, but never able to achieve any 
unity or solidarity. See c. TAYLOR, Atomism, in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: 
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 187 (1985). 
4. In well-known standing cases of the 1960s and 1970s, courts relying on this model denied 
standing to the individual plaintiffs who sued as citizens because their injuries were not distinct 
from the harm suffered by other citizens. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 
418 U.S. 208 (1974) (citizen alleged violation of the incompatibility clause because some mem-
bers of Congress also held positions in military reserves); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 
166 (1974) (taxpayer alleged violation of article I because the public budget of the CIA was not 
itemized, an omission of "statement anci accounting"). The taxpayer and citizen plaintiffs in 
these cases argued that as individuals whom the law regards as taxpayers or citizens, they pos-
sessed specific interests that the government injured. The Supreme Court, however, found it 
rather easy to reject this line of reasoning because the Court has traditionally viewed the judici-
ary as the arbiter of disputes between the claims of private individual persons. See Richardson, 
418 U.S. at 174-75, 179 (recommending that the legislature provide the forum for taxpayers and 
citizens to argue their concerns against the government). 
The sort of argument underlying Schlesinger and Richardson assumes that the property of 
having suffered a distinct injury supposedly separates a litigant from the rest of the populace, and 
concludes that without a distinct injury a prospective litigant may not invoke the jurisdiction of a 
federal court. See generally J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY 145 (1978) (explaining the rationale 
behind equating injury and unique identity). Working from the premise that a personal injury 
distinguishes a litigant from the general population, it follows that a citizen or taxpayer cannot 
invoke standing based on a claim staked on taxpayer or citizen identity. In fact, asserting the 
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Unfortunately for plaintiff-associations, many interests adopted by 
associations do not fit this atomistic model. For example, interests in 
a clean environment or an ongoing system of unemployment benefits 
express social or public concerns that do not reduce easily to the inter-
est of any one person.5 Despite the acknowledged importance of such 
concerns, 6 current standing doctrine denies them judicial protection. 
Associations often seek to redress injuries to interests that can only be 
understood nonatomistically, yet current associational standing retains 
an allegiance to the individualistic model of interest. This prevents 
courts from redressing an injury to any interest best modelled as a 
collective one. Often, such interests take shape just because a group of 
people form an association to share a joint concern. Alone, no one 
member embodies the interest at stake, but in banding together all of 
the members create a vehicle that does possess a distinct, potentially 
vulnerable interest. The association serves as such a vehicle not be-
cause it is like any single individual - no single individual bears the 
association's interest - but specifically because it is unlike an 
individual. 7 
Although courts acknowledge the existence and advantages of as-
sociation, the lack of a coherently articulated conception of collective 
interest prevents realization of the benefits of association within the 
legal system. The tension in the judicial system between acknowledg-
ing these benefits and sticking to an atomistic model of interest 
manifests itself in inconsistent grants of associational standing. Even 
when faced with interests that the Supreme Court has articulated as 
legitimate for associations to represent, some courts have relied on the 
atomistic model of interest to deny associational standing. 8 In the 
end, current doctrine weakens the ability of associations to litigate ef-
interest of a taxpayer or citizen presupposes that the rest of the populace shares the interest in 
question. Since all other adults are taxpayers and/or citizens, a claim based on these identities 
serves only to demarcate the taxpayers or citizenry from the government, not from one another. 
Thus, this sort of argument would deny standing to taxpayer-plaintiffs and to citizen-plaintiffs. 
This argument, however, contains an odd feature. The government itself does not seem to be 
the sort of atomistic individual the Court required the plaintiffs in these cases to be. "The gov-
ernment" includes people who are citizens and taxpayers, but enjoys a legal identity of its own. 
By accepting the government as a litigant, courts already acknowledge a potential plaintiff whose 
injuries do not demarcate it as a single, isolated agent, comparable to a single human being. The 
government itself provides a paradigm of an entity that cannot be construed atomistically. 
5. For discussion of the inapplicability of the atomistic interpretation to such interests, see 
infra Part I and notes 69-77 and accompanying text. 
6. See, e.g .. UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 290 (1986); Wald, The D.C. Circuit: Here and 
Now, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 718, 721 (1987) (recognizing the impact associational standing has 
upon the availability of protection for certain public interests); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 
405 U.S. 727, 741-55 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); 405 U.S. at 755-60 (Blackmun, J,, dissent-
ing), infra note 20. 
7. See infra Part II.A. 
8. See infra Part LB; see also National Maritime Union v. Commander, Military Sealift Com-
mand, 824 F.2d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Associated Gen. Contractors v. Otter Tail Power Co., 
611 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1979). 
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fectively by forcing them to filter their claims through the traditional, 
atomistic model of interest. Some legitimate associational claims, 
however, cannot survive this process. Real collective interests worthy 
of judicial protection fall by the wayside for want of a framework to 
accommodate them. 
This Note asserts that associations merit standing when they seek 
to litigate collective interests they reasonably claim as theirs. Part I of 
this Note examines the state of judicial doctrine on associational 
standing, and illustrates how current doctrine hampers associations by 
refusing to recognize, and thus protect, interests that fit naturally with 
those the Supreme Court has regarded as associational. Part II re-
works the concept of associational standing by formalizing collective 
interest and arguing for the association as the appropriate legal repre-
sentative of such interest. Finally, Part III addresses the separation of 
powers concerns raised by a reworked concept of associational stand-
ing, and concludes that the suggested concept contributes to the uni-
queness of the judiciary's role rather than encroaching on the 
legislature's domain. 
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF ASSOCIATIONAL STANDING9 
A. Supreme Court Doctrine 
The Supreme Court has recently embraced the concept of associa-
tional standing. 10 In UAW v. Brock, 11 the Court stated: 
9. Federal courts award standing to associations on two grounds, as organizations in their 
own rights ("organizational standing") and as representatives of members' interests 
· ("representational standing"). See supra note 4. Recent developments have concerned 
representational associational standing, the type reconsidered in this Note. This Note does not 
address organizational associational standing because such standing does not concern collective 
interests. 
Representational standing offers the possibility of recognizing that although associations may 
be composed of individuals with their own legal identities as members, and may have legally 
individual identities themselves, they are the bearers of interests that are irreducibly collective. 
See infra Part II.A. Organizational standing treats the association as a single individual and 
recognizes that it can suffer harms structurally equivalent to those suffered by any legal 
individual. Associational interests of this sort do not require the rearticulation suggested here 
because they fit comfortably within the traditional atomistic view of interest. There are 
instances, however, where it seems a court will force an association's claim into the 
organizational category to sidestep the issue of the collective interest. See, e.g., Havens Realty 
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378 (1982). 
In Havens, a residential counseling association objected to the racial steering practices of an 
apartment complex. The association sought standing on both organizational and 
representational grounds. Without reaching the latter contention, the Court granted the former, 
stating that it would "conduct the same inquiry as in the case of an individual," 455 U.S. at 378, 
and concluding that the actions of the complex could drain the organization's resources and 
impair its ability to advise apartment-seekers effectively. 455 U.S. at 379. Given the recent and 
regular confusion about when to grant individuals standing, the efficacy of likening associational 
standing to individual standing seems doubtful. See Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 208; Richardson, 
418 U.S. at 166; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 83 (1968). 
10. See UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274 (1986). 
11. 477 U.S. 274 (1986). 
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[T]he doctrine of associational standing recognizes that the primary rea-
son people join an organization is often to create an effective vehicle for 
vindicating interests that they share with others. "The only practical 
judicial policy when people pool their capital, their interests, or their 
activities under a name and form that will identify collective interests, 
often is to permit the association or corporation in a single case to vindi-
cate the interests of all." 12 
Despite this wholehearted endorsement of associational standing and 
recognition of its potentially unique role, the Court in Brock continued 
to rely on a set of criteria for representational standing13 that defeated 
the purposes of the doctrine the Court espoused. Although the Brock 
Court was able to frame that case in terms of these criteria, the Court's 
development of the criteria in previous cases and application in subse-
quent appellate decisions reveals the tension between the Supreme 
Court's acknowledgement of the legitimacy of associational interests 
and the current criteria courts use to decide representational standing. 
In Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission, 14 the Supreme 
Court itemized the criteria for representational standing15 using a 
three-pronged test. According to Hunt, an association has standing 
when "(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their 
own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the or-
ganization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief 
requested requires the participation of individual members in the law-
suit. "16 This test reflects the tension implicit in the Court's attempt to 
formulate representational standing so as to vindicate members' asso-
ciational interests while still retaining a tie to the atomistic model of 
interest. By building individual standing into the first criterion for 
representational standing, the Court undercut the idea that members 
of an association share interests that would not exist but for the possi-
bility of association - or collectivity - itself. 17 
The test articulated in Hunt encapsulates requirements for repre-
sentational standing that the Supreme Court had already imposed 
prior to Hunt. Two of these earlier cases illustrate the anomalous re-
sults produced by the logic of a criterion requiring individual standing 
before awarding representational standing. In Sierra Club v. Mor-
ton, 18 the Supreme Court denied a long-established environmental 
protection association representational standing because the associa-
12. 477 U.S. at 290 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 
187 (1951)). 
13. For a discussion of representational standing, see supra note 9. 
14. 432 U.S. 333 (1977). 
15. These criteria were originally suggested in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502, 511 
(1975). 
16. 432 U.S. at 343. 
17. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. 
18. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
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tion failed to show that any particular member would be individually 
harmed by recreational development of federal parkland. The Sierra 
Club refused to send a token member through the parkl~nd, thus lay-
ing the groundwork for a claim of individual deprivation of the park's 
natural beauty, precisely because the Club wanted to argue for preser-
vation of the area as a shared natural resource. 19 The dissenting jus-
tices recognized the disingenuousness of demanding that 
environmental cases be litigated on the basis of ad hoc individualistic 
claims, particularly in the face of legitimate associational interests. 20 
The deceptiveness of the individual standing requirement as a test of 
legitimate interest becomes overwhelmingly apparent in the reasoning 
of a later environmental case, United States v. Students Challenging 
Regulatory Agency Procedure (''SCRAP''). 21 There, the Court 
awarded representational standing to a newly formed association of 
five law students, who sued a federal agency for granting a fee increase 
to railroads. The students claimed that the rate increase threatened 
each of their individual interests by (1) increasing the costs of inexpen-
sive bottled and packaged goods, because the added shipping costs for 
transporting used bottles and packaging to recycling centers would be 
passed along to them as consumers; and (2) interfering with their use 
of natural resources in a given area for recreational and aesthetic pur-
poses. 22 In fact, the case concerned the environmental impact of effec-
tively raising the cost of recycling, but because SCRAP willingly 
translated their claim into atomistic terms, the Court granted standing 
to an "environmental association" far less established than the Sierra 
Club23 to vindicate an environmental injury far less obvious than the 
one threatened in the Sierra Club case . 
. Although the association-plaintiffs in both Sierra Club and SCRAP 
reacted differently to the necessity of satisfying the individual standing 
requirement, these associations did have the option of protecting a col-
lective interest by creating a sufficiently related individual interest. In 
this manner, protecting the "dummy" individual interest would suffice 
to protect the underlying collective concern. Additionally, both the 
Sierra Club and SCRAP could create the requisite individual injury at 
little cost to the associations themselves. In other cases, however, the 
very collectiveness of the injury precludes the use of this ploy because 
it will be in no single individual's interest to risk playing the tester's 
19. 405 U.S. at 735-36. 
20. 405 U.S. at 741-45 (Douglas, J., dissenting); 405 U.S. at 755-58 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Blackmun asked, "Must our law be so rigid and our procedural concepts so inflexi-
ble that we render ourselves helpless when the existing methods and the traditional concepts do 
not quite fit and do not prove to be entirely adequate for new issues?" 405 U.S. at 755-56. 
21. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
22. 412 U.S. at 678. 
23. 412 U.S. at 685. The age and history of an association seem to be good indicators of the 
association's commitment to the interest it seeks to litigate. See infra text accompanying note 87. 
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role, particularly if it involves more than sending a member for a stroll 
through the park. 24 
Aside from its susceptibility to reliance on token individual plain-
tiffs, the first Hunt criterion creates another type of confusion for asso-
ciational standing doctrine. The doctrine of individual standing 
suffers from a controversy over just how personal an injury must be to 
qualify the plaintiff for standing. By assimilating the requirements for 
associational standing into the requirements for individual standing, 
plaintiff-associations become mired in the same controversy.25 
The Court's decision in Allen v. Wright 26 illustrates this problem. 
In Allen, the plaintiffs sought to state a representational claim accord-
ing to Hunt's terms, arguing that an individual among them would 
have standing. The Court rejected this argument, maintaining that no 
member's injury demarcated him sufficiently from the population the 
plaintiffs sought to represent.27 The Court's denial rested on grounds 
similar to those specified in United States v. Richardson 28 and Schles-
inger v. Reservists Committee To Stop the War: 29 no member's injury 
was sufficiently personal to qualify him as a unique litigant. The 
group of black parents seeking standing in Allen claimed that IRS 
standards for tax-exemption were too lax and allowed discriminatory 
private schools to claim tax exemption. According to the Court, this 
claim could not be maintained by any individual parent, because even 
if the regulations made it more difficult for blacks as a group to obtain 
equal public education for their children, the regulations in and of 
themselves did not make any single parent's search for equal education 
more arduous. 30 A meaningful concept of representational standing, 
24. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). In Warth, the Supreme Court introduced 
the individual injury requirement in denying standing to, among others, an association of firms 
engaged in residential construction. This association claimed injury by the exclusive zoning 
practices of a town planning board, but the Court refused to recognize the injury because the 
association could not produce a member who had sought a low-income housing building permit 
from the board and been denied. 422 U.S; at 516. No firm, however, would attempt to acquire a 
permit because of the large investment necessary in making a presentation to the board. Yet the 
zoning board's practices clearly indicated denial of any permit for low-income housing. The 
members of the association had a shared, collective interest in changing the town's zoning prac-
tices, but no single firm had an interest in being the token: the collective nature of the injury 
effectively thwarted any individual response by removing individual incentive to challenge the 
zoning practices. 
25. See supra note 9. 
26. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
27. 468 U.S. at 755-56. 
28. 418 U.S. 166 (1974); see supra note 4. 
29. 418 U.S. 208 (1974); see supra note 4. 
30. 468 U.S. at 756-57. Writing for a divided Court, Justice O'Connor asserted: "Recogni-
tion of standing in such circumstances would transform the federal courts into 'no more than a 
vehicle for the vindication of value interests of concerned bystanders.'" 468 U.S. at 756 (quoting 
United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 687). In his dissent, Justice Brennan made the point that 
the black parents seeking standing were more than "concerned bystanders" and had, in fact, 
suffered a "distinct" and "palpable" injury. 468 U.S. at 770, 773 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
Justice O'Connor failed to recognize that judicial formulation of societal values pervades the 
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however, would recognize that the black parents as-a group had a le-
gitimate representational interest in government behavior that in-
creased the segregation of schools, whether or not any single member 
could have brought suit against the government. Such a group might 
possess, and choose to represent, an interest not reducible to, or cap-
tured by, an individual atomistic interest.31 
The first Hunt criterion is not the only one to sneak atomism into 
the foundation of representational standing. The third criterion, the 
test of whether the claim or relief requires individual participation in 
the lawsuit, 32 can also work to defeat an associational claim of interest. 
This test can always reintroduce atomism by requiring individual 
members to testify if their atomistic interests diverge from the collec-
tive interest.33 However, possible diversity of members' interests at an 
atomistic level does not negate the possibility of an associational com-
mitment to the protection of one another's interests. In this sense, 
people can share interests they would not regard themselves as having 
were it not for their relation to other people - as when a gameplayer 
reports his own inadvertent cheating because he shares an interest 
with his opposite number: the integrity of the game. Either player 
could "testify" to this interest. In fact, to understand fully the integ-
rity of the game is to recognize this. But the third criterion of the 
Hunt test eliminates recognition of this type of mutual interest or testi-
mony and would, in effect, only recognize the harm to the cheated 
player. If we take membership seriously as a phenomenon, the collec-
tive interest belongs both to the association and to each member inso-
far as she is part of the association. 
The hurdles raised by the three-pronged test prevent associations 
from doing exactly what the Supreme Court identified as an important 
function in UAW v. Brock: 34 to vindicate the members' shared interest 
through litigation.35 The Brock Court granted standing to the UAW 
concept of injury sufficient to merit standing: deciding that a particular type of harm and type of 
victim qualifies for standing indicates a value considered worthy of protection by societal mecha-
nisms. This idea of the judiciary's role differs radically from that which explains courts as the 
mechanisms that replace combat in the case of interpersonal disputes. See J. VINING, supra note 
4, at 145. Professor Vining maintains that courts develop and articulate what we value. If Pro-
fessor Vining is correct, refusal to characterize associational standing as distinct from individual 
standing diminishes collective values, just as refusal to recognize certain interests as sufficiently 
personalized constitutes a rejection of the values asserted by that interest holder. 
31. See infra Part II.A. 
32. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
33. In Harris v. MacRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), an association of women sought to challenge 
the Hyde Amendment, which limits the use of Medicaid to fund abortions, as a violation of the 
free exercise clause of the first amendment. The association claimed that some of its members 
had a religious interest in being able to obtain abortions. The Court countered that because not 
all members had this interest, the association's claim required individual participation. 448 U.S. 
at 321. 
34. 477 U.S. 274 (1986). 
35. "[T]he doctrine of associational standing recognizes that the primary reason people join 
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in order for the union to protest a Department of Labor regulation 
that resulted in the denial of supplementary unemployment benefits to 
displaced union members. The Secretary of Labor's attack on the 
union's representational standing was twofold: he argued that the 
union failed each of the Hunt criteria36 and that the test - and with it, 
representational standing altogether - should be rejected as duplica-
tive of the test for class actions. 37 The Court, however, responded by 
affirming the separate advantages of associational standing and apply-
ing the Hunt criteria as loosely as possible in an effort to have them 
encompass injury to a nonatomistic interest. 38 
This emphasis on the identifiably collective outlook and purposes 
of association derives from an older set of pre-Hunt cases. These cases 
indicate a closer identity between organizational and representational 
standing. In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 39 the 
Court awarded organizational standing, but in a dissent urging repre-
sentational standing, Justice Jackson recognized members' own ac-
knowledgement of a shared interest in joining an association: 
"[P]eople pool their capital, their interests, or their activities under a 
an organization is often to create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with 
others." 477 U.S. at 290. 
36. 477 U.S. at 282-88. The Secretary of Labor contended that because the union was not 
seeking actual unemployment benefits but was instead asserting the unlawfulness of the regula-
tion, it could not demonstrate the possibility of individual standing. 477 U.S. at 283-84. This 
type of argument parallels that used successfully against the plaintiffs in Allen v. Wright, 468 
U.S. 737 (1984), see supra note 30 and accompanying text. However, the Brock Court rejected 
this argument because union members potentially affected by the regulations had a "live interest" 
in the litigation, 477 U.S. at 284, and "a direct challenge" by the union was "not only proper, but 
appropriate." 477 U.S. at 286. The Court easily found grounds for union standing on the second 
Hunt criterion, germaneness of the organization's purpose to the lawsuit, because the union's 
constitution stated among its purposes an effort to work for legislation implementing an effective 
system of federal unemployment insurance. 477 U.S. 286-87. 
The Secretary contended that the union's claim required the individual participation of mem-
bers whose finances would be variously injured because of the Department's regulations. But 
since the union's claim did not concern particular benefits owed to any member, the Court dis-
missed this argument. 477 U.S. 287-88. 
37. 477 U.S. at 288. Significantly, the Court recognized the prior collective organization of 
an established association, as opposed to the contingent nature of the aggregation of class action 
plaintiffs: 
The Secretary's presentation, however, fails to recognize the special features, advantageous 
both to the individuals represented and to the judicial system as a whole, that distinguish 
suits by associations on behalf of their members from class actions. While a class action 
creates an ad hoc union of injured plaintiffs who may be linked only by their common 
claims, an association suing to vindicate the interests of its members can draw upon a pre-
existing reservoir of expertise and capital. 
477 U.S. at 289. The Court's comments distinguish between a truly collective entity and an ad 
hoc union, despite the emphasis on the atomistic benefits of association for members, rather than 
an emphasis on the possibility that only associations represent genuinely common claims. 
Not only are class actions different from collective claims, but class action lawsuits are declin-
ing as well, see Martin, The Rise and Fall of the Class-Action Lawsuit, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1988, 
at B7, col. 3, and hence seem an impractical substitute for associational representation. 
38. See supra notes 36 & 37. 
39. 341 U.S. 123 (1951). 
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name and form that will identify collective interests .... "40 In Brock, 
the Court subsequently capitalized on Justice Jackson's point in its 
endorsement of association.41 And in NAACP v. Alabama, 42 the 
Court granted representational standing to the NAACP when it 
sought to assert the privacy rights of its members, calling the associa-
tion "the medium through which its individual members seek to make 
more effective the expression of their own views. "43 
Tension is thus evident between these earlier hints at the concept 
of interest underlying association - interests the Court continues to 
recognize - and the Court's latest articulation of the requirements for 
representational standing. The individualistic requirements of the 
Hunt test require a conception of association that does not jibe with an 
idea of association as a medium that blends individual interests into an 
independent shared interest - as the NAACP v. Alabama Court sug-
gested. Similarly, the Hunt concept does not support the claim that an 
. association more effectively vindicates shared interests because associ-
ational and shared interests mutually constitute one another - as Jus-
tice Jackson implied. Part II of this Note demonstrates structural 
reasons for the inconsistency between the two views of association and 
collective interest. The remainder of this section reveals the confusion 
this tension has created at the appellate level. 
B. Representational Standing in the Appellate Courts 
Each of the Hunt criteria has been interpreted differently by the 
different courts of appeals, and the decision in Brock seems to have 
done little to inspire convergence. The difference between the First 
Circuit and the D.C. Circuit regarding the requirement of individual 
standing, the first prong of the Hunt test, reveals the tremendous am-
biguity created by this criterion. In a case tailor-made for satisfying 
the Hunt criteria, Camel Hair and Cashmere Institute, Inc. v. Associ-
ated Dry Goods Corp., 44 the First Circuit relied on Brock's "strong 
endorsement"45 in granting representational standing to a five-member 
association of cashmere merchant firms. In Camel Hair, the associa-
tion sued a manufacturer for overstating the amount of cashmere in its 
products. Because any one of the firms could have sought injunctive 
relief against the manufacturer in the interest of preserving the reputa-
tion of cashmere, the court held that the association met the first of the 
Hunt requirements.46 
40. 341 U.S. at 187. See also supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
41. 477 U.S. at 290. 
42. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
43. 357 U.S. at 459. 
44. 799 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1986). 
45. 799 F.2d at 11. 
46. 799 F.2d at 12. 
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But in National Maritime Union v. Commander, Military Sealift 
Command 41 - a case more complicated than Camel Hair, yet con-
cerning a union interest arguably similar to that in Brock- the D.C. 
Circuit maintained that the association had run afoul of the first re-
quirement of the Hunt test. The court denied standing to unions seek-
ing to ensure that the government adhered to regulations governing 
wage determinations when awarding jobs to private contractors. 
While recognizing that the government's irregular procedure might 
have reduced the overall number of positions available, the court 
nonetheless held that the union could not show a causal connection 
between the procedure and the loss of employment by any particular 
member.48 Thus, the court refused to grant standing on the basis re-
lied upon in Brock: that the union had the right to protect a shared 
interest (in this case, maintenance of job positions) not easily framed in 
atomistic terms. 
Despite the difference in result between Camel Hair 49 and Na-
tional Maritime Union, so both courts of appeals cast their decisions 
according to the aggregative concept of association exemplified in the 
Hunt decision.st The courts decided these cases according to the ease 
with which the interests of the associations could be reduced to indi-
vidual interests, with the First Circuit applying a liberal construction 
of Hunt, and the D.C. Circuit a stringent one. Such latitude for dis-
cretion defeats the practical realization of the Brock Court's endorse-
ment of associational standing for the sake of collective action: "[T]he 
doctrine of associational standing recognizes that the primary reason 
people join an organization is often to create an effective vehicle for 
vindicating interests that they share with others. 'The only practical 
judicial policy . . . is to permit the association . . . to vindicate the 
interests of all.' "S2 
Because the second prong of Hunt ascertains whether the associa-
tion's interest is germane to its overall purpose, organizations typically 
meet this test easily by reference to their organizational constitutions 
or their statements of purpose in bringing suit. s3 More troublesome 
47. 824 F.2d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
48. 824 F.2d at 1235-36, 1240. 
49. 799 F.2d at 6. 
50. 824 F.2d at 1228. 
51. An "aggregative" concept of association perceives the association's interests as the sum 
of its members' pre-associational individual interests, rather than as interests that would not exist 
but for the associational relationships members share with one another. See generally supra text 
accompanying note 17; infra Part II.A. 
52. UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 290 (1986) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. Mc-
Grath, 341 U.S. 123, 187 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
53. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commn., 432 U.S. 333, 344-45 (1977) (since 
Commission functioned as a trade association, protection of commercial interest germane to re-
spondent's purpose); see also Brock, 477 U.S. at 286 (the Court cited UAW's constitution as. 
support for its claim that protection of unemployment benefits was germane to the union's pur-
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for the courts, however, has been deciding whether diversity among 
the interests of members overrides statements of associational purpose, 
thus preventing an association from satisfying the third Hunt require-
ment. This prong of the Hunt test rules out representational standing 
when a case would require individual participation or proof of the rele-
vant interests. 54 In cases where members are diverse or not similarly 
situated against the defendant, the Eighth Circuit has denied standing 
even in the face of an admittedly legitimate associational interest. 55 
The D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, has taken Brock as the definitive 
statement on representational standing and has refused to regard di-
versity among member interests as a bar to standing when a legitimate 
collective claim is asserted.56 The Sixth and Tenth Circuits have also 
applied the third Hunt criterion liberally. Like the D.C. Circuit, these 
courts relied on the rationale that member diversity should be dis-
counted since members expect to incur some costs in the course of 
associating. 57 
pose); Camel Hair, 199 F.2d at 11 ("As harm to the reputation of cashmere is precisely the kind 
of harm the plaintiff corporation was designed to prevent, the requirement that the suit be ger-
mane to the association's purposes is clearly met here."). But see Minnesota Pub. Interest Re-
search Group v. Selective Serv. Sys., 557 F. Supp. 925, 934 (D. Minn. 1983), vacated on other 
grounds, 747 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1984) (second prong not satisfied because the association was, 
by name, a "public interest" group; therefore, its purposes were automatically too broad to un-
derpin any specific interest). 
54. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320-21 (1979). 
55. See Terre Du Lac Assn. v. Terre Du Lac, Inc., 772 F.2d 467, 471 (8th Cir. 1985), cert 
denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986) (residents' association sought injunctive relief against community 
owner for failure to provide promised facilities (i.e., country club, sewer system) but because 
monetary damages possibly at stake, individualized proof required); Associated Gen. Contractors 
v. Otter Tail Power Co., 611 F.2d 684, 691 (8th Cir. 1979) (plaintiff-association sought to make 
an antitrust claim but due to differences between member firms individual participation 
required). 
56. See National Maritime Union v. Commander, Military Sealift Command, 824 F.2d 1228, 
1233 (D.C. Cir. 1987). "[T]he [Supreme] Court appeared to deal with the problem of conflicting 
interests by saying that associational standing was too valuable to jettison and offering possible 
safeguards for members whose interests were adverse to the litigating position taken by the asso-
ciation." In National Maritime, the D.C. Circuit also gave its own rationale for rejecting mem-
ber diversity as a bar to representational standing: because internal conflicts are endemic to 
associations, members expect to incur certain costs to their own interests upon joining. Courts 
can entertain injured members' challenges to the association's internal procedures for determin-
ing which interests to litigate - but so long as these procedures were predetermined and fol-
lowed, the court will uphold standing. 824 F.2d at 1233-34. Compare National Maritime, 824 
F.2d at 1228, with Telecommunications Research of Action Center v. Allnet Communication, 
806 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (representational standing denied because damages sought; indi-
vidual member participation necessary to determine division of these). 
57. See, e.g., Gillis v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 759 F.2d 565, 572-73 
(6th Cir. 1985) (defendant's assertion of conflict arising from diversity of members was "specula-
tive and indirect"; such conflict is the association's concern, not the court's). The court 
explained: 
Virtually any relief involving the expenditure of money that benefits some but not all of an 
organization's members potentially means that that money will be unavailable to or in part 
exacted from the remainder of the membership. By joining an organization dedicated to a 
particular goal in the public interest, members indicate a willingness to make certain sacri-
fices productive of that goal. Carried to its logical extreme, evaluation of representational 
standing in terms of the adverseness of remote interests of discrete members would seriously 
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These discrepancies between and within the courts of appeals indi-
cate the difficulties of applying representational standing doctrine 
without a clear understanding of the sort of interests uniquely suited 
to associational representation. Courts need a concept of a collective 
interest that lends itself to consistent grants of associational standing 
and prevents standing from becoming a tool for predisposing of cases 
on the merits. 58 A reformed test would obviate the need for artificially 
produced token injuries to individuals59 and would avoid the reduc-
tion of associational claims to individual claims. 60 A concept of col-
lective interest that alleviates these discrepancies would justify the 
distinctive characterization of associational standing developed in 
Brock 
II. FROM REPRESENTATIONAL TO COLLECTIVE STANDING 
In discussing and awarding representational standing, the courts 
have recognized that members of associations possess shared re-
sources, 61 shared problems,62 and shared self-understandings.63 Yet 
current doctrine denies associations a legal identity that would truly 
afford an opportunity to litigate common problems using common re-
sources. To effectuate the virtues of associational standing, courts 
need a framework that will inform the recognition of such virtues by 
articulating a definition of what it means for resources, problems, and 
undermine the ability of individuals through organizations to achieve public interest objec· 
tives through the legal system. 
759 F.2d at 572-73. See also NCAA v. Califano, 622 F.2d 1382, 1391-92 (10th Cir. 1980) (diver· 
sity of member interests is a reality of association and a cost members accept; where its members 
have conflicting interests, an association must demonstrate to court fairness of procedure in deci-
sion to litigate). 
58. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); see also Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the 
"Passive Virtues''-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 CoLtJM. L. 
REV. 1 (1964); supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. 
59. See, e.g., United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedure 
("SCRAP"), 412 U.S. 669 (1973); see also supra text accompanying notes 19-24. 
60. Any grant of representational standing decided on the basis of the Hunt test does this by 
recognizing associational standing only insofar as individual standing would have been granted. 
See supra text accompanying notes 17 & 33. 
61. See Brock, 411 U.S. at 289 (unlike class action plaintiffs, an associational plaintiff "can 
draw upon a pre-existing reservoir of expertise and capital"); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. 
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 187 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (in associations "people pool their 
capital, their interests, or their activities under a name and form that will identify collective 
interests"). 
62. See Brock, 477 U.S. at 290 ("the primary reason people join an organization is often to 
create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with others"); Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186, 207 (1961) (association of voters sought "relief in order to protect or vindicate an 
interest of their own, and of those similarly situated") (emphasis added). 
63. See Brock, 477 U.S. at 290 ("The very forces that cause individuals to band together in an 
association will thus provide some guarantee that the association will work to promote their 
interests."); National Maritime Union v. Commander, Military Sealift Command, 824 F.2d 
1228, 1233-34 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (because members of associations have thrown in their lots to· 
gether, they expect and accept certain costs to individual self-interest). 
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self-understandings to be "shared" or "common." This framework 
should yield a concept of collective standing that succeeds in capturing 
those legitimate associational interests that representational standing 
cannot. Subsection A of this Part. identifies the structure of a collec-
tive good, and the type of interest to which such a structure gives rise. 
The existence of such a structure and its attendant interests provides 
the ground for collective standing. Subsection B explicates the reasons 
for awarding collective standing to associations rather than 
individuals. 
A. The Interest of a Collectivity 
In its purest form, a collectivity provides an identity distinct from 
that of its individual members, an identity that makes sense only in the 
context of the members' relationship to one another and to other ac-
tors in the social world. The collectivity then can further interests that 
atomistic agents, acting in isolation, cannot. Collectivities can thus be 
understood both in terms of these interests and in terms of their struc-
ture and function in contemporary society. This subsection focuses on 
the formal character of a collective interest and indicates the collectiv-
ity's alignment with the protection of such an interest. One familiar 
example of a collectivity is the labor union: once organized, workers 
share in an identity separate from and irreducible to their identities as 
isolated employees. In fact, the union identity diverges from the indi-
vidual identities. An effort to form an illegal union - say in an indus-
try in which unionization is prohibited - illustrates this. Imagine 
that an upstart union calls a strike to pressure the employer into rec-
ognizing the union and negotiating higher wage rates. During the 
course of the job action strikers will not be paid - and if the action 
fails, participating workers will not be rehired. Striking, therefore, 
poses some risk to participants. For the strike to be effective, the 
owner's business must be hobbled. Achieving this effect, however, 
does not require that absolutely every employee refuse to work, only a 
number sufficient to cripple operations. Thus, the optimal strategy for 
each isolated employee is to report to work (remaining on payroll and 
ensuring her job post-strike) while betting that enough workers dedi-
cated to unionization will strike successfully (harming the owner's in-
terests enough to gain recognition of the union in return for resuming 
work).64 Of course, if each employee realizes this strategy, the union's 
64. This situation presents a classic free-rider problem. Free-rider problems arise when a 
good can be provided at no cost to any individual who fails to contribute so long as most or all of 
the other agents do contribute. One common illustration is that of a lawn that a group wishes to 
keep untrammeled. A single person taking a short-cut across the lawn will not wear a path in the 
grass, but if everybody takes the shortcut, soon there will be only dirt. If each single person 
assumes she can cross with impunity (say, )Vhen nobody else is looking), everybody will end up 
crossing, defeating attainment of the desired public good: an untrammeled lawn. For further 
examples and a discussion of the difficulties in coordinating collective action, see R. LEMPERT & 
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effort to organize and strike will disintegrate, precisely because its in-
terest cannot be reduced to those of isolated employees. 65 
In more formal terms, the relations between workers themselves, 
and between workers and the collective goal, serve to defeat the at-
tempt to unionize. This structure is known as a Prisoner's Dilemma. 
The Prisoner's Dilemma appears in a number of forms, including the 
following. 
Two prisoners are known to be guilty of a very serious crime, but there is 
not enough evidence to convict them. There is, however, sufficient evi-
dence to convict them of a minor crime. The District Attorney . . . 
separates the two and tells each that [he] will be given the option to 
confess if [he wishes] to. If both of them do confess, they will be.con-
victed of the major crime on each other's evidence, but in view of the 
good behavior shown in squealing, the District Attorney will ask for a 
penalty of ten years each rather than the full penalty of twenty years. If 
neither confesses, each will be convicted only of the minor crime and get 
two years. If one confesses and the other does not, then the one who 
does confess will go free and the other will go to prison for twenty years. 
Each prisoner sees that it is definitely in his interest to confess no 
matter what the other does. If the other confesses, then by confessing 
himself this prisoner reduces his own sentence from twenty years to ten. 
If the other does not confess, then by confessing he himself goes .free 
rather than getting a two-year sentence. So each prisoner feels that no 
matter what the other does it is always better for him to confess. So both 
of them do confess guided by rational self-interest, and each goes to 
prison for ten years. 66 
J. SANDERS, AN INVITATION TO LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 309-16 (1986); R. BORK, THE 
ANTITRUST PARADOX 430-31, 435 (1978). 
65. See generally C. OFFE, Interest Diversity and Trade Union Unity, in DISORGANIZED 
CAPITALISM 151 (1985). Offe argues that contemporary West German unions confront an in-
creasing diversity of member interests due to the differences in socioeconomic status of workers. 
He argues that unions can maintain solidarity only by strengthening their identities through 
addressing issues beyond wage rates, including qualitative concerns with both workplace and 
politics. See id. at 164-69. This amounts to a broadening of the range of issues considered collec-
tive. Perhaps the widening scope of issues associational plaintiffs seek to litigate reflects a similar 
trend. To ensure protection of collective goods, some have suggested that courts grant standing 
to entities more alien to the law than associations. See, e.g., C. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE 
STANDING? (1974) (arguing that the best way to protect interests in the environment would be to 
confer "rights" on natural entities and allow for their direct representation). 
66. See Sen, Behaviour and the Concept of Preference, in RATIONAL CHOICE 60, 69 (J. Elster 
ed. 1986). 
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In this diagram, Players A and B are the 
two prisoners. C stands for "confess"; -C 
stands for "don't confess." Player A's 
resulting sentences are represented in the 
upper left comer of each box, Player B's 
in the lower right. 67 
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The scenario demonstrates that it is strategically rational for each 
player to confess regardless of what the other does. But, if both con-
fess, as the aggregation of individual rational choice would have it, 
they are worse off (ten-year sentences) than if neither did (two-year 
sentences). From the outside of the Prisoner's Dilemma, we can see 
that if A and B both adopt the strategy that makes sense from each of 
their individual perspectives ("confess"), each will be worse off than if 
each chose not to confess. It might seem plausible to think both pris-
oners can also discern this before they actually choose a strategy. But, 
even if each knows the other will come to this realization, the Dilemma 
cannot be resolved; for, just at the moment A realizes that B perceives 
the problem, and thus the benefits of the strategy "don't confess," it 
becomes all the more individually rational for A to choose the strategy 
"confess," and receive no sentence at all. The collective solution is 
highly unstable. 
In the union example, each member· occupies the place of one of 
the prisoners. Like the prisoners, the union members share a necessar-
ily common problem: they cannot achieve the best outcome for the 
group if each aims toward the best outcome for himself. Both prison-
ers and workers require an escape from the disintegrative pattern into 
which they seem locked; they need access to a new conception of their 
relationship to one another, so that they may cooperatively address 
67. Id. 
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their common concerns. A collectivity supplies the perspective from 
which to do this. By forming a union and regarding themselves as 
members, as well as employees, workers give themselves reason to par-
ticipate in union activities and to trust that others will not free ride. 68 
To understand membership from the collective perspective is to realize 
that it is incompatible with free riding. 
Any effort to attain a common good, such as the workers' attempt 
to better conditions for the entire labor force, is vulnerable to collec-
tive action problems. 69 Other examples of common goods range from 
a well-played game to language itself - goods that cannot be known 
nor had alone. 70 More relevant, perhaps, to the legal context are so-
called public goods.71 These include parks72 and a clean environ-
ment, 73 roads and sewers, 74 a governmental system of unemployment 
68. See R. LEMPERT & J. SANDERS, supra note 64, at 321 n.28. Lempert and Sanders give a 
rather unsympathetic account of possible techniques unions may use to encourage workers to 
adopt a collective perspective. They suggest that "propaganda," "normative appeals," and "co-
ercion" are particularly effective, and hence widely used, techniques. 
69. The notion of a "common good" has been extended to phenomena not usually character-
ized as "goods." On this view, not only are certain goods necessarily shared or social - any 
action whatsoever is, in fact, social. As Nobel Prize-winning economist Kenneth Arrow states: 
[A]ll significant actions involve joint participation of many individuals. Even the apparently 
simplest act of individual decision involves the participation of a whole society. 
It is important to note that this observation tells us all non-trivial actions are essentially 
the property of society as a whole, not of individuals. It is quite customary to think of each 
individual as being able to undertake actions on his own .... Formally, a social action is 
then taken to be the resultant of all individual actions. In other words, any social action is 
thought of as being factored into a sequence of individual actions . 
. . . [But] the particular factoring in any given context is itself the result of a social policy 
and therefore already the outcome of earlier and logically more primitive social values. 
Arrow, Values and Collective Decision-making, in PHILOSOPHY AND EcoNOMIC THEORY 110, 
114 (1979). See also infra Part 111.B for further discussion of Arrow's work. 
70. A well-played game is a simple example of this sort of good. See supra text accompany-
ing note 33; see also J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971): 
[T]he common desire of all the players [is] that there should be good play of the game. This 
shared end can be realized only if the game is played fairly according to the rules, if the sides 
are more or less evenly matched, and if the players all sense that they are playing well. But 
when this aim is attained, everyone takes pleasure and satisfaction in the very same thing. A 
good play of the game is, so to speak, a collective achievement requiring the cooperation of 
all. 
Id. at 525-26; see also J. HABERMAS, What Is Universal Pragmatics?, in COMMUNICATION AND 
THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY (1979) (detailing the mutual presuppositions necessary for linguis-
tic communication); 1 J. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 284-337 
(1984) (interrelating the mutuality oflanguage and the possibility of social cooperation); C. TAY-
LOR, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, in 2 PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: 
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 15 (1985) (arguing that social science must study intersubjective and 
common meanings to understand human life because language constitutes social reality). 
Additionally, a collective itself is a collective good - it cannot be known or had alone. 
71. Technically, "public goods" is an economic term used to describe those goods that can-
not be provided for one person without providing them for everybody. In the legal context, 
disputes often arise when the provision of these goods depends upon the contributions of all those 
who will partake of them. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. 
72. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
73. See United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedure ("SCRAP"), 
412· U.S. 669 (1973). 
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insurance,75 and an integrated society. 76 Maintaining any of these 
goods requires the cooperation of everybody - or alm:ost everybody 
- who partakes of them. And, as the cases demonstrate, people db 
form and join collectivities to achieve, sustain, and protect such 
goods.77 
As illustrated in this section, a collective interest differs in struc-
ture from an individual interest. It can be understood as an interest 
susceptible to free riding or to the collective self-defeat manifested in 
the outcome of a Prisoner's Dilemma. When collective organizations 
possess such interests, they may suffer a unique injury, either because a 
specifically collective interest or good is threatened, or because the col-
lectivity itself is threatened. 78 The criterion for collective ·standing 
ought to be that the plaintiff-association seeks to protect an interest 
that is identifiably collective and therefore not equivalent to any atom-
istic interests. 
B. Awarding Associations Collective Standing 
Aside from serving identifiably collective interests, associations 
also manifest the distinct nature of a collectivity by virtue of their in-
ternal organization and their societal role. These characteristics differ-
entiate the association from other legal actors, thereby demonstrating 
that it is worthy of standing to protect interests specific to the associa-
tion. Because associations possess unique identities related to the pro-
tection of collective interests, and because isolated individuals are 
insufficiently related to such issues, courts should award and limit col-
lective standing to associations. 
When collectives seek to solve problems regarding shared goods, 
they face concerns pertinent exclusively to themselves, rather than to 
any single individual.79 The collective possesses its own identity. This 
identity may grow from members' relationships to one another and the 
members' relationships to nonmembers, but it is distinct from mem-
bers' individual identities and singular concerns. 80 Modern corporate 
74. See Terre Du Lac Assn. v. Terre Du Lac, Inc., 772 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
475 U.S. 1082 (1986). 
75. See UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274 (1986). 
76. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 771 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
77. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (collective interest in integrated schools); 
Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commn., 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (collective interest in 
maintaining the reputation of Washington apples); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) 
(collective interest in protecting wild land). 
78. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S 123, 140-41 (1951) (an or-
ganization is harmed when defendant impairs its ability to attract and keep members). 
79. As the union example demonstrates, these concerns may run counter to those of any 
particular individual, even if he belongs to the collective. See note 64 and accompanying text. 
80. See R. LEMPERT & J. SANDERS, supra note 64, at 308-09. Lempert and Sanders discuss 
the rise of organizations in modern capitalist society, noting that "[some] organizations have a 
legal life that is distinct from their current membership. They exist apart from any individuals." 
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law recognizes this by defining a corporation as a legal person, apart 
from its directors, shareholders, and employees.81 Labor law also ac-
knowledges distinctive collective identity by institutionalizing the sta-
tus of unions. 82 Ostensibly, the law in these areas has responded to the 
reality of contemporary social life: business and labor require defini-
tively collective identities to pursue their goals. 83 The law has also 
noted that people associate to pursue noneconomic aims, recognizing 
the efficacy of collective action in these areas. 84 
This recognition of the unique societal position associations oc-
cupy should be the basis for a correlatively significant legal role: re-
garding associations as the exclusive bearers of collective standing. 85 
Id. at 308 (emphasis added); see also J. VINING, supra note 4, at 156-57 (1978) (explaining the 
concept of a legal identity that is distinct from individual human beings' identities). Contempo· 
rary systems theory generates a similar point: 
If ... a systems-theory approach is chosen, the very distinction between individualism and 
collectivism becomes questionable. Systems theory neither reduces collective action to indi-
vidual action nor vice versa, but interprets both as different forms of social attribution of 
action .... [W}e would suggest that the social reality of a legal person is a "collectivity'~· the 
socially binding self-description of an organized action system as a cyclical linkage of identity 
and action. 
G. Teubner, Enterprise Corporatism (unpublished manuscript} (on file with the Michigan Law 
Review). Such a collectivity need not be as legally formalized as a corporation or labor union. A 
private association, or even a more informal group may have the characteristics requisite to 
collectivity. See C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 3-5 (1975) (portraying a jury "institution-
ally," or as a collectivity). 
81. See R. LEMPERT & J. SANDERS, supra note 64, at 318-20, 324-36. Joseph Vining makes a 
similar point, extending it beyond corporations, and stressing the strength of such legal identity. 
Professor Vining writes: 
If the majority, even an overwhelming majority, of the individuals associated with an insti-
tution wish to define its interests and change its purposes to reflect another aspect of their 
concern, they may, depending upon the rules of the institution, be utterly unable to do 
so ... ·• This is the orthodoxy of the law of organization .•.• The embarrassing facts of the 
large modem corporation or the multinational corporation - that control over its voice is 
secured and transferred quite without regard to its vast membership, and equity investment 
is treated as merely one among many of a number of sources of capital to be maintained to 
the degree necessary but no more - do not fit standard conceptual models, but do confirm 
the independent life of these institutions .... Corporate or associational existence is little 
different from the existence of the "person" who speaks without obvious institutional affilia-
tion .... Each is the embodiment of a value or a set of values. 
J. VINING, supra note 4, at 156-57 (emphasis added). 
82. See R. LEMPERT & J. SANDERS, supra note 64, at 321-24, 339-47. 
83. This is not to suggest that business and labor confront symmetrical collective action 
problems, nor that unions and corporations are structurally identical collectivities. See R. 
LEMPERT & J. SANDERS at 347 (union is "a legal structure that allows workers to organize 
against corporate power"); C. OFFE, Two Logics of Collective Action, in DISORGANIZED CAPI-
TALISM 170, 175-206 (1985) (explaining that differences between the circumstances of workers 
and those of employers require that each group organize itself differently in order to achieve 
economic or political success); C. OFFE, The Attribution of Public Status to Interest Groups, in 
DISORGANIZED CAPITALISM 221, 248-53 (1985) (explaining the salient differences implying dif-
ferent statuses for various interest groups). 
84. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 187 (1951) (Jack-
son, J., concurring); UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 289 (1986). 
85. Recognition of collective standing as the appropriate litigative stance for associations 
would replace the current division between organizational and representational standing. See 
supra note 9. This division rests on the assumption that some interests belong to an organization 
and others belong to its members. Insofar as the organization may be analogized to the model of 
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Courts can refine their selection of which associations to recognize as 
the representatives of particular collective interests according to an as-
sociation's degree of formal organization86 and demonstrated COJDmit-
ment to the claimed interest. 87 A stronger requirement along these 
lines might prevent the type of anomaly produced when the Supreme 
Court denied standing to the Sierra Club, 88 a long-established environ-
mental protection group, and awarded it to SCRAP,89 a group formed 
hastily to litigate a single environmental issue. To delineate collective 
standing, courts could require that the history of the association and 
its activities display an investment of resources, financial and other-
wise, in the interest asserted. 
Due to the nature of a collective good,90 an injury to that good 
cannot damage a single individual's interest.91 Because a collective 
good consists in being shared among people, those individuals also 
the individual person, it may sue to protect its own interests. For an illustration of the ambigui-
ties of organizational standing, compare Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378-79 
(1982) (housing counseling association awarded organizational standing because defendant's ex-
clusion of minorities strained association's resources and hindered performance of its function), 
with Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (refugee counseling asso-
ciation denied standing to sue government for preventing refugees from entering the country, 
hence preventing counseling). Sometimes - if the Hunt criteria are satisfied - the association 
may sue to protect simultaneously all of its members' interests, still presenting these as essentially 
individual. Collective standing eliminates this dichotomy, urging that organizations litigate only 
interests that can be characterized as theirs, whether these be interests in maintaining the collec-
tivity itself or in achieving collective aims. Removing the cleavage between organizational and 
representational standing accords with the Supreme Court's endorsement of association, because 
the split between organizational and representational standing undermines the mutual identifica-
tion between members and their associations. Such a split institutionalizes the possibility of di-
vergence between individual and associational interests, fostering such problems as the Prisoner's 
Dilemma and free-riding. See supra text accompanying note 66; see generally T. SCHELLING, 
Strategic Analysis and Social Problems, in CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 195, 207-12 (1984) (a 
survey of tactics that undermine collective action by driving a wedge between private and group 
interests). Under collective standing, associations do not partake of two legal identities. Rather, 
courts would recognize them as discrete legal entities with related and congruent interests. 
86. See c. OFFE, The Attribution of Public Status to Interest Groups, in DISORGANIZED CAP-
ITALISM 221, 237-42 (1985) (urging "public status" - legal identity - for those groups recog-
nized and regulated by statute or electoral vote, receiving assistance from state resources, 
operating with a formal internal organization, and participating in political life); National Mari-
time Union v. Commander, Military Sealift Command, 824 F.2d 1228, 1232-34 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(an association merits standing despite diversity of member interests if it employs established 
internal procedures for deciding whether to bring suit). 
87. In order to regard a particular interest as one held by the association in the way required 
for standing, courts already seek some proof of this commitment. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington 
Apple Advertising Commn., 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). 
88. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
89. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures ("SCRAP"), 412 
U.S. 669 (1973). See supra text accompanying notes 18-24. 
90. See supra Part II.A. 
91. Cf Doernberg, "We the People'': John Locke, Collective Constitutional Rights and Stand-
ing to Challenge Government Action, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 52 (1985). Doernberg treats as collective 
the interests at stake in taxpayer and citizen standing suits, and argues that an individual citizen 
deserves standing to redress injury to such interests. His view seems more prey to separation-of-
powers concerns than does collective standing. See infra Part III.A. 
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share the harm of any impediment to its achievement. No single per-
son can claim the injury as one to him alone.92 Since a personal con-
nection to the injury claimed remains one of the general prerequisites 
to standing,93 the fact that injuries to collective goods cannot damage 
any one individual's interest requires that a collectivity such as an as-
sociation, rather than a single person, be the possessor of collective 
standing. 94 
Notwithstanding the structural incongruity of assigning collective 
standing to single individuals, membership in an association may cre-
ate a sufficient connection between a particular individual and a collec-
tive injury to justify a grant of collective standing to a single member. 
Although plausible, this alternative misconstrues the nature of partici-
pation in a collectivity. Amartya Sen draws a distinction juxtaposing 
two possible characterizations of the motives for membership: 
[We] must distinguish between two separate concepts: (i) sympathy and 
(ii) commitment. The former corresponds to the case in which the con-
cern for others directly affects one's own welfare. If the knowledge of 
torture of others makes you sick, it is a case of sympathy; if it does not 
make you feel personally worse off, but you think it is wrong and you are 
ready to do something to stop it, it is a case of commitment.95 
If people joined associations solely on the basis of sympathy, they 
would cooperate with one another in order to further their own indi-
vidual interests.96 In the case of a union, this would imply that the 
members all feel for one another. Each, therefore, behaves so as to 
better one another's lot because if others are better off, then, in turn, 
the participant himself will be better off. This puts a tremendous 
92. Recall Rawls' example of ballplayers seeking a good play of the game, supra note 70 at 
525-26. Cheating interferes with this collective good, which is possible only if all the players 
participate fairly and wholeheartedly. No one person could play a ballgame by herself, let alone 
achieve a good play of the game. Accordingly, no one person suffers alone when somebody 
cheats; rather, the play of the game, shared by all, suffers. 
93. See generally Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
94. This argument resembles those espoused in cases where the Supreme Court denied stand-
ing to individual citizens claiming injury to general interests. The Court objected that such 
plaintiffs had not differentiated themselves sufficiently from the entire public. Thus, the Court 
reasoned, the plaintiffs could not define their injury in a manner that would ensure concrete 
presentation of the relevant issues. Mere concern for the principles at stake did not constitute an 
interest vulnerable to legally cognizable injury. See Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 216-27; Richardson, 
418 U.S. at 176-80. In these cases, the Court expressed further reservations regarding separa-
tion-of-powers problems raised by citizen standing. This Note addresses these reservations and 
maintains that collective standing is immune from them. See infra Part III. 
95. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory, in 
PHILOSOPHY AND EcONOMIC THEORY at 95 (1979). See also Simon, From Substalltive to Proce-
dural Rationality, in PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMIC THEORY at 67-68 (1979) (distinction between 
substantive rationality in which an agent acts to achieve "given goals within the limits imposed 
by given conditions and constraints" and procedural rationality, which is "the outcome of appro-
priate deliberation"); M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE at 182-83 (1982). 
96. As the Supreme Court noted in UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 289 (1986), this conception 
matches more nearly the nature of a class action suit. 
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weight on the empathy and altruism - the sympathy - of union 
members. If this seems farfetched in the union case, altruism and em-
pathy appear to be even more unlikely motives for members of associa-
tions concerned, for example, with parks far from their homes. Even 
if members do have some sympathetic motivation for associating and 
participating in associational activities, free rider situations97 demon-
strate that even a sympathetic member will often choose not to partici-
pate if she realizes her contribution would be marginal.98 Sympathy, it 
seems, fails to motivate the participation necessary for creating and 
protecting a common interest. 
Rather, joining and participating in an association suggests that 
members are willing to "do something" - pay dues, strike, distribute 
pamphlets - about the association's collective goals from motives 
other than the possibility of personal utility gains.99 Rather, members 
display a commitment to the collective aims pursued by the associa-
tion, and to the collectivity itself. They can be expected to understand 
the nature of such a commitment. Courts have understood this in 
granting representational standing to associations despite potential di-
vergence of individual members' interests from those of the associa-
tion.100 These decisions regard membership not as a personal 
connection to the injury sought to be redressed, but as an indication of 
the members' own recognition of the aptness of a joint pursuit of a 
collective interest. Taking a cue from these cases, courts should rely 
on the members' perceptible commitment as justification for granting 
collective standing to the association. 
C. Applying a Doctrine of Collective Standing 
Regardless of one's personal preference for or against collective ac-
tion, the proposed reformulation of associational standing - collec-
tive standing - has two practical advantages over the Hunt model. 
First, collective standing accords with the theoretical justifications re-
97. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
98. As social philosopher Jon Bister explains: 
[T]here can be no way of justifying the substantive assumption that all forms of altruism, 
solidarity and sacrifice really are ultra-subtle forms of self-interest, except by the trivializing 
gambit of arguing that people have concern for others because they want to avoid being 
distressed by their distress. And even this gambit ... is open to the objection that rational 
distress-minimizers could often use more efficient means than helping others. 
J. EtsrER, SOUR GRAPES 10 (1983). 
99. This is not to deny that unionized workers receive personal utility gains because of union-
ization. When compared with the gains of free-riding (receiving union benefits without partici-
pating in membership activities), these gains do not, however, suffice to explain membership. A 
motive other than personal utility must be attributed to those members who do not free-ride in 
order to understand their behavior. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
100. See National Maritime Union v. Commander, Military Sealift Command, 824 F.2d 
1228, 1231-34 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Gillis v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 759 F.2d 565, 
572-73 (6th Cir. 1985); NCAA v. Califano, 622 F.2d 1382, 1391-92 (10th Cir. 1980); see also 
supra notes 56 and 57. 
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lied upon by the Supreme Court in granting standing to the UAW in 
Brock 101 Second, in applying a standing doctrine that resolves the 
tension between the individualistic model of interest and the endorse-
ment of an association emphasizing collective concerns, courts can 
align their decisions on standing and eliminate the previous tendency 
toward inconsistency. For example, reference to collective standing 
could have enabled the Supreme Court to eliminate the incongruity 
between its decisions in Sierra Club 102 and SCRAP. 103 
The first advantage of the proposed reformulation of associational 
standing is its consistency with the Supreme Court's theoretical justifi-
cation for associational standing set out in Brock In Brock, the Court 
granted standing to the UAW in order for the union to protest a De-
partment of Labor regulation that resulted in the denial of supplemen-
tary unemployment benefits to displaced union members.104 As 
emphasized previously, 105 the Court justified its decision in terms of 
the unique nature of associational standing, which acknowledges that 
"the primary reason people join an organization is often to create an 
effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with 
others."106 This Note has already argued that the Hunt test (basing 
associational standing on individual standing) defeats this justification 
for associational standing. 107 Collective standing, on the other hand, 
follows from the justification put forth in Brock The Brock Court 
acknowledged that in forming associations, members identify exactly 
the sort of shared interests collective standing is premised upon. tos 
The Court also realized that associations, having organized themselves 
so as to pool both economic and noneconomic resources, distinguish 
themselves as distinct legal actors, best suited to protecting the shared 
interests they serve.109 If the Supreme Court had decided the question 
of the UAW's standing according to the collective model, these realiza-
tions would have supported the conclusion that the union was seeking 
to protect a common good (a system of unemployment insurance) that 
it was particularly suited to defend - because a workers' association 
exists and garners resources precisely to protect the well-being of 
workers understood as a group. This approach would have avoided 
the tensions engendered by forcing Hunt's terms upon Brock 
In the same manner, the collective model would have allowed 
101. UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274 (1986). 
102. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
103. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures ("SCRAP"), 412 
U.S. 669 (1973). 
104. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. 
105. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. 
106. 477 U.S. at 290. 
107. See supra Part I. 
108. See supra Part II.A. 
109. See supra Part 11.B. 
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standing to the Sierra Club in Sierra Club v. Morton. 110 There, the 
Court could have granted standing on the basis of its recognition that 
the Sierra Club sought to protect a shared interest in preserving public 
wild land; that a long-standing environmental association existed and 
developed means expressly to safeguard such an interest; and that this 
interest was not equivalent to any particular individual's interest in 
enjoying nature. 111 Conversely, in SCRAP, 112 the Supreme Court 
could have applied the collective model to reject the "dummy" inter-
est, denying standing to a plaintiff who was awarded standing on the 
basis of the Hunt test. 113 Alternatively, the Court could have granted 
standing to SCRAP by recognizing its true interest - protecting re-
cycling as a means for reducing pollution - as a shared one, legiti-
mately litigated by an association designed for this purpose. Either 
way, the Court could have decided SCRAP according to the principles 
the collective model would have imposed upon Sierra Club. The con-
cept of collective standing resolves the incongruity and counterintui-
tiveness of the opposite results the Supreme Court actually reached in 
this pair of cases. 
These examples of applying collective standing merely suggest 
ways in which a court could conceive of standing problems in terms of 
a collective model. Although in actual circumstances the issues of 
whether an interest is truly shared or whether a particular association 
is a legitimate protector of that interest will be subtle and complex, 
these issues are not undecidable. The association's background and 
prior activities provide guides to determining the answers. 114 By 
awarding collective standing on the basis of criteria relevant to collec-
tivity, courts will come closer to consistency both across cases and 
within doctrine - significant assets to the judicial process. 
III. COLLECTIVE STANDING AND SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Efforts to modify or expand the grounds for standing tend to pro-
voke discussion about the role of the judiciary within the tripartite 
design of the United States government. This Part addresses the im-
pact of collective standing on the role of the courts in a system requir-
ing separation of the legislative and judicial functions. Subsection A 
argues that collective standing avoids an expansion of judicial poli-
cymaking power and, in fact, reserves the crux of this power to the 
legislature. Subsection B employs a brief illustration from social the-
ory to demonstrate the need for collective standing within a democ-
110. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
111. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. 
112. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
113. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
114. See supra text accompanying notes 86 and 87. 
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racy, and hence the appropriateness of judicial application of the 
doctrine. 
A. The Separation-of-Powers Objection and a Response 
Although this Note presents collective standing as a reformulation 
of the already existing doctrine of associational standing, critics might 
construe collective standing as an expansion of access to the courts. 
Conservatives in particular react negatively to any such expansion, 
and urge narrow grounds for standing as a means of protecting the 
separation of powers. 115 This subsection denies that collective stand-
ing allows the judiciary to encroach on legislative prerogatives. 
The main argument made by advocates of a circumscription of 
standing runs as follows. The judiciary serves the purpose of protect-
ing individual - and minority - rights against the will of the major-
ity, 116 which holds sway in the legislature and the election of the 
executive. The courts, therefore, avoid settling disputes over value: 
that is the role of the "political" forums. 117 If courts grant standing to 
entities seeking to do more than protect predetermined individual 
rights, they open themselves to becoming just another political arena, 
and a usurper of the legislative function. 118 From this viewpoint, col-
lective standing might be regarded as the doorway to determination of 
the value of collective action: a judicial fiat regarding an issue better 
suited to legislative deliberation. This objection, however, depends 
upon a disputable picture of the judiciary's role and a misguided con-
flation of existing collective interests and the value of encouraging the 
development of potential ones. 
The separation-of-powers objection portrays the courts as value-
neutral guardians of presupposed, inherent individual interests. 119 But 
in the course of resolving conflicts between individuals, the courts al-
ways decide what will count as a legally cognizable interest. And this 
conclusion necessarily includes a value judgment. 120 To maintain that 
the courts should only protect "individual interests" is already a judg-
115. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984) (O'Connor, J.); Haitian Refugee 
Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 803, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Bork, J.); Scalia, The Doctrine of 
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 
(1983). 
116. See Scalia, supra note 115, at 894; Haitian Refugee Center, 809 F.2d at 803. 
117. Scalia, supra note 115, at 892; Allen, 468 U.S. at 752. 
118. Scalia, supra note 115, at 881. 
119. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
120. J. VINING, supra note 4, at 145. Professor Vining elaborates: 
That extra dimension to the securing of justice special to the role of a judge lies in the special 
place of courts in ... defining public values. For in the very recognition of a "person" who 
is "harmed" courts formally cap the formulation of a value ... confirm it in our language 
and our thought, and permit a full and continuous search for its realization to begin. 
Id. at 171. See generally, Arrow, supra note 69, at 114-15 (legal identification of what qualifies as 
property illustrates value choice in judicial decision). 
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ment that will entail protection of some values at the expense of 
others. So it cannot be a decisive objection against collective standing 
that it clears the way for judicial value judgments - these already 
occur in practically every case. 
We can, however, shift the emphasis of the original objection and 
attribute to it the following claim. Perhaps both the judiciary and the 
legislature make value judgments but they do so at different levels, 
employing distinct techniques. The legislature aptly decides questions 
of public policy and 'issues regulations accordingly; the courts decide 
cases of particular injury to interests and make judicial awards accord-
ingly. The objection continues: collective interests are necessarily 
matters of policy and cannot be injured in a judicially cognizable 
sense. Therefore, any attempt, either by an individual or by an associ-
ation, to vindicate collective interests through legal channels belongs 
to the legislative process rather than to the courts. 
The response to this reformulated separation-of-powers objection 
is twofold. First, nothing in the nature of an interest mandates that it 
be lodged only in single individuals. In fact, courts already recognize 
interests other than those unique to individual persons, allowing cor-
porations and associations to argue their claims, even at the expense of 
a particular individual's interest. 121 Thus, the sheer collectivity of an 
interest should not relegate it exclusively to legislative consideration. 
Second, collective standing treats associational claims as ones of inter-
est, not pure policy. Having an interest denotes a private, particular 
attachment to the matter at hand - an already defined attachment 
vulnerable to injury. Collective standing delineates collective interest 
so as to highlight these aspects. Asserting a policy preference, on the 
other hand, suggests a general push for governmental support of cer-
tain kinds of interests. Whereas judicial recognition of discrete collec-
tive interests would serve to protect those interests already formulated, 
claimed, and injured, legislative policies in favor of collective interests 
would promote their development in the first place.122 Collective 
standing requires only that courts address injury to formally estab-
lished collective interests, not that the judiciary actively foster their 
development. 
121. J. VINING, supra note 4, at 156. "In view of who the person is that speaks in social 
discourse, the attribution of 'legal personality' to institutions - corporations, associations, part-
nerships, unions - should occasion no surprise .... " 
122. See c. OFFE, Two Logics of Collective Action, in DISORGANIZED CAPITALISM 170 
(1985) (differences between capital and labor require different conditions for forming collective 
identity and engaging in associational practices); C. OFFE, The Attribution of Public Status to 
Interest Groups, in DISORGANIZED CAPITALISM 221, 237, 239-42 (1985) (suggesting mechanisms 
of state assistance for collective organization and arguing that the state must pursue different 
policies to further the organization of different types of interest groups). A more general discus-
sion of collective interests beyond those involved in standing would include a focus on the gener-
ative dimension of such interests. In some cases, people do not know their shared interests until 
they conceive of themselves as a collectivity. 
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B. A Coda: Collective Standing as a Practical Solution to Arrow's 
Impossibility Theorem 
Collective standing not only avoids intruding upon separation of 
powers, it reinforces the functional role of the judiciary in a demo-
cratic society. This section illustrates this point by suggesting that col-
lective standing, a tool of the judiciary, presents a practical.solution to 
a classic theoretical problem about voting. Research in social theory 
has shown that democracy, understood solely as a voting mechanism, 
cannot fully determine a society's preferences of possible environ-
ments.123 In other words, democratic voting fails to isolate any one 
option as the unique social choice of the majority of voters. This fail-
ure results in the "indeterminacy" of voting. This characterization of 
voting as fundamentally ill-suited to reaching a definite, accurate out-
come has alarming implications for democracies governed by legisla-
tures, since legislatures rely on voting as a decisionmaking procedure. 
A decisionmaking procedure that fails to yield meaningful results of-
fers little or no authoritative guidance. This section argues that opera-
tions of the judiciary, such as recognition of collective standing, 
prevent the indeterminacy of voting from paralyzing actual demo-
cratic government. 
To redress the indeterminacy of voting, other mechanisms of 
choice must be used, and in actual democracies the nonlegislative 
branches of government serve this purpose. Because the judiciary does 
not utilize voting as its primacy. decisionmaking mechanism, its 
processes are not subject to the indeterminacy inherent in basic major-
ity voting.124 This subsection argues that by recognizing collectives 
and granting them standing, courts allow for the articulation of social 
options that cannot be adequately presented in a legislative forum. 
This articulation removes one of the constraints upon voting that so-
cial theoreticians have pinpointed as a cause of indeterminacy. Hence, 
the judiciary forestalls indeterminacy and facilitates legislative deci-
sionmaking. Rather than encroach upon the legislative function, judi-
cial grants of collective standing aid the operations of the legislature. 
Economist Kenneth Arrow proved the indeterminacy of voting as 
a social choice mechanism. 125 Arrow's Impossibility Theorem demon-
strated that no determinate social choice mechanism can be simultane-
ously aggregative, 126 Pareto-optimal, 127 independent of nonexistent or 
123. See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text. 
124. Although the justices and judges of the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals vote 
on their decisions, this voting procedure is unlike the one employed in the legislature. The deci-
sions of these courts are expressed in written opinions, not simple tallies. 
125. Arrow, supra note 69, at 121-25. 
126. "Aggregative," in this context, means deriving a social ordering of preferences over 
states of the world from a collection of individual preferences of this sort. Arrow, supra note 69, 
at 120. 
127. The "Pareto principle" requires that "[i]f alternative x is preferred to alternative y by 
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irrelevant alternatives, 128 and nondictatorial.129 Arrow chose these 
conditions as appropriate constraints upon a voting procedure serving 
as social choice mechanism. But he also made a stronger claim, based 
on the condition of the independence of irrelevant alternatives: "[t]he 
condition of the independence of irrelevant alternatives implies that in 
a generalized sense all methods of social choice are of the type of vot-
ing." 130 In effect, Arrow claimed that each of the conditions places a 
reasonable, important constraint on any social choice mechanism, and 
that requiring the independence of irrelevant alternatives commits any 
such mechanism to the form of voting. But, taken together, the condi-
tions prevent any given voting mechanism from coming up with deter-
minate social choices.131 
Weakening any one of the conditions would resolve the trouble-
some indeterminacy. If, however, the condition of the independence 
of irrelevant alternatives is weakened, two things follow. First, the 
concept of open-ended possibility is reintroduced into social choice. 
Voters usually face a yes/no choice that seems to exhaust the social 
possibilities. Introducing previously nonexistent - and hence, irrele-
vant - options alleviates the tendency toward the status quo in "any 
historically given situation."132 This rejuvenates the element of choice 
in social decisionmaking. For previously unconsidered possibilities to 
wend their way into the voting procedure, however, they must be ar-
ticulated as concrete alternatives. Here the second result of weakening 
the independence of irrelevant alternatives comes into play: reassert-
ing the force of outside alternatives requires ways of conceptualizing 
them for consideration. And, consequently, a niche is formed for a 
judiciary in the business of responding to social developments by pro-
tecting newly articulated interests. Associations and their interests, 
defined collectively, present a paradigmatic opportunity for this sort of 
activity. "[I]n the very recognition of a 'person' who is 'harmed' 
every single individual according to his ordering, then the social ordering also ranks x above y." 
Arrow, supra note 69, at 120. 
128. "The social choice made from any environment depends only on the orderings of indi-
viduals with respect to the alternatives in that environment." Arrow, supra note 69, at 120. 
129. "There is no individual whose preferences are automatically society's preferences in-
dependent of the preferences of all other individuals." Arrow, supra note 69, at 121. 
130. K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 27-28 (2d ed. 1963). 
131. A simple example of the indeterminacy arises from violating the condition of the inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives, as happens in rank-order voting: 
[S]uppose that there are three voters and four candidates, x, y, z. and w. Let the weights for 
the first, second, third, and fourth choices be 4, 3, 2, and l, respectively. Suppose that 
individuals I and 2 rank the candidates in the order x, y, z, and w, while individual 3 ranks 
them in the order z. w, x, and y. Under the given electoral system, x is chosen. Then, 
certainly, if y is deleted from the ranks of the candidates, the system applied to the remain-
ing candidates should yield the same result, especially since, in this case, y is inferior to x 
according to the tastes of every individual; but, if y is in fact deleted, the indicated electoral 
system would yield a tie between x and z. 
Arrow, supra note 130, at 27. 
132. K. ARROW, supra note 130, at 119. 
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courts formally cap the formulation of a value . . . and permit a full 
and continuous search for its realization to begin. "133 
This is not to say that the legislature does not also deliberate and 
settle on new alternatives and values, which are then put to a vote. It 
is only to say that by incorporating new prospects into legal doctrine, 
courts make a unique contribution to the process. In choosing to pro-
tect collective interests, courts give them a chance to be chosen by the 
legislature as worthy of fostering. And by recognizing and articulat-
ing these interests, courts offer the legislature ,previously hidden alter-
natives. This eases one of the constraints upon legislative voting that 
would otherwise contribute to the problematic indeterminacy identi-
fied by social theory. By combining the legislative and judicial func-
tions this indeterminacy can be avoided in practice. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Note makes a case for reformulating associational standing by 
concentrating on its intrinsically collective character, rather than 
treating it as a stepsister of traditional individual standing. The collec-
tive nature of certain inten:;sts dictates that they can only be borne by 
groups such as associations. These associations are thus the only legit-
imate protectors of these interests. The Supreme Court has recognized 
that, in forming and joining associations, individuals themselves con-
ceive of their interests as shared amongst themselves - not reiterated 
from member to member. 134 A move to collective standing would 
shift the requirements for associational standing from criteria suited to 
individual Interests held iri isolation, to criteria relevant to shared in-
terests held in common. Thus, collective standing should foster uni-
formity in grants of standing to associations and vindicate those 
virtues of association already recognized in judicial doctrine. 
- Heidi Li Feldman 
133. J. VINING, supra note 4, at 171 (emphasis added). 
134. See UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 287-90 (1986). See also supra notes 34-43 and accom-
panying text. 
